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1. Introduction 
 
The source of ambiguities in meanings, whether it is purely semantic or something else, 
is often hard to pinpoint. While it is rather straightforward to identify the ambiguities 
derived from syntactic structures, so-called scope ambiguities may constitute a problem 
for their source of ambiguities. The reason for this difficulty with scope lies in the 
possibility that the ambiguity in question is more attributed to semantic entailment than to 
different syntactic structures. In other words, it is often hard to differentiate “true” 
ambiguities from “prima facie” ambiguities.  
The goal of this paper is to provide a closer examination of the scope issue, ultimately 
suggesting that scope ambiguities, as well as syntactic ambiguities, can be derived from 
different syntactic structures. I will first review two types of ambiguities: syntactic 
ambiguities and scope ambiguities. After showing how these two types of ambiguities are 
different in nature, I will briefly introduce May’s (1977) quantifier raising, in an attempt 
to show that scope ambiguities, as well as syntactic ambiguities, can be derived solely 
from different syntactic structures. I will then point out that scope ambiguities may 
potentially face a problem: apparent ambiguities might just be a product of entailment. 
Exploring a similar scope phenomenon in Japanese, I show that scope ambiguities are in 
fact theoretically well-motivated. This view enables syntax to deal with scope ambiguities 
as well as syntactic ambiguities, providing a unified treatment of ambiguities in general. 
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Notice, however, that the wide scope reading of some girl entails the wide scope reading 
of every boy. If there is a popular girl and every boy happens to love the same girl, then it 
must also be true that for every boy, there is some girl that he loves. It just happens to be 
the case that the girl that every boy loves is the same one. If so, the two readings are not 
independent from each other, but rather one entails the other. 
This is not very good news for us because if entailment is responsible for the apparent 
ambiguity, there is no need for different structures for each reading. Ideally, syntax and 
semantics correlate with each other, and the next section in fact attempts to argue for 
motivate scope ambiguities as a product of operation at the syntax-semantics interface. 
 
5. Getting around the Problem 
 
It has been widely reported in the literature (Bobaljik & Wurmbrand 2005; Nomura 
2003, 2005; Sano 1985, Tada 1992 among many others) that nominative objects in 
Japanese, when equipped with the morpheme dake ‘only’, arguably show scope ambiguity. 
Consider (9): 
 
(9) a.  John-wa   salada-dake-ga   tabe-rare-ru 
   John-TOP  salad-only-NOM  eat-can-PRES 
   ‘John can eat only salad.’    
   Interpretation 1 (only > can):  
   It is only salad that John can eat.  
   (John can eat salad & it is not the case that John can eat things other than salad.) 
   Interpretation 2 (can > only): 
   It is possible for John to be able to eat only salad.  
   (John can eat salad & not things other than salad.) 
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 b. John-wa   salada-dake-o   tabe-rare-ru 
   John-TOP  salad-only-ACC eat-can-PRES 
   ‘John can eat only salad’     
   #Interpretation 1 (only > can):  
   It is only salad that John can eat.  
   (John can eat salad & it is not the case that John can eat things other  
   than salad.) 
   Interpretation 2 (can > only): 
   It is possible for John to be able to eat only salad.  
   (John can eat salad & not things other than salad.) 
 
What has been reported in the literature (Nomura 2003, 2005) is that the nominative object 
in (9a) ambiguously takes wide or narrow scope over the stative predicate -rare, while the 
accusative object in (9b) unambiguously takes narrow scope below -rare.1 However, as 
has been pointed out in Sugimura (2012), if we consider these examples in terms of 
entailment, we immediately run into the same problem pointed out in the previous section. 
This is so because the wide scope reading of the nominative object necessarily entails the 
narrow scope reading. 
Fortunately, the same does not hold the other way round: the narrow scope reading does 
not entail the wide scope. In other words, it is possible to isolate the wide scope reading of 
the nominative object. This is because the wide scope reading would be false if John in (9), 
for example, could eat things other than salad. To see this, consider (10): 
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(10) a.  John-wa  salada-dake-ga   tabe-rare-ru.  
   John-TOP  salad-only-NOM  eat-CAN-PRES 
   Demo, hanbaagaa(-dake)-mo   tabe-rare-ru. 
   but   hamburger(-only)-also eat-CAN-PRES 
   ‘John can eat only salad, but he can also eat (only) hamburgers.’ 
 b. John-wa  salada-dake-o   tabe-rare-ru.  
   John-TOP  salad-only-ACC eat-CAN-PRES 
   Demo, hanbaagaa(-dake)-mo   tabe-rare-ru. 
   but   hamburger(-only)-also eat-CAN-PRES 
   ‘John can eat only salad, but he can also eat (only) hamburgers.’ 
   (constructed based on Nomura’s (2003) examples) 
 
The follow-up statement in (10a) and (10b) will contradict the wide scope reading but be 
consistent with the narrow scope reading because John can clearly eat other things than 
salad. Thus it is possible to show that the wide scope reading of the nominative object is 
unavailable by manipulating the context, which in turn proves that the sentence in (9a) is 
in fact ambiguous; the two readings are respectively detected by their truth-values.  
In contrast, it is very difficult to isolate the narrow scope because the wide scope 
reading necessarily entails the narrow scope. Since the narrow scope reading is merely to 
say that ‘John is able (permitted, allowed etc.) to not eat non-salad things,’ it could simply 
be true if the wide scope interpretation is true: that is, if salad were the only thing he could 
eat, it is also true that he can eat salad and not other things. For this reason, I do not 
speculate any further about the obligatory narrow scope reading of the accusative object in 
(9b) reported in the literature and instead focus on scope of the nominative object. In fact, 
as Koizumi (1994; 1995) reports, the wide scope reading is also available under certain 
circumstances such as focused interpretations. Thus, the obligatory narrow scope of the 
accusative object requires further research. 
Even if we leave aside the obligatory narrow scope of the accusative object, however, as 
long as there is an entailment relationship between the wide and the narrow scope, it is 
difficult to say that there are two different semantic interpretations, and that each 
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interpretation corresponds to a different syntactic structure. Although I do not have a 
direct answer to this problem, and it is beyond the scope of this paper, I would like to 
explore a possible way around this. 
While there cannot be a situation where entailment does not hold in 
simple-clause-sentences like (9), Sugimura(2012) notes that it appears to be possible to set 
up two readings where neither of them entails the other, once we add another predicate 
such as the causative -sase. Consider the following two scenarios: 
 
(11)   Context A 
Andrea wants to control what her cat Midnight eats, but usually he just eats 
whatever he wants and not what Andrea wants. For some reason, she is only able to 
make Midnight eat bread. She cannot make him eat other things. 
 
(12)   Context B 
Midnight usually eats all sorts of things at the same time. But Andrea is able to 
make Midnight only eat bread. She manages to make him not even look at fish. 
 
Context A forces the wide scope reading of the object, whereas Context B the narrow 
scope reading. Both wide and narrow scope readings are in fact available with the sentence 
below: 
 
(13)  Andrea-wa Midnight-ni    Pan-dake-ga    tabe-sase-rare-ru. 
      -TOP        -DAT bread-only-NOM eat-CAUS-CAN-PRES 
 ‘Andrea is able to make Midnight eat only bread’ 
 Interpretation 1 (only > can):  
 It is only bread (and nothing else) that Andrea is able to make Midnight eat. 
 Interpretation 2 (can > only): 
 Andrea is able to make Midnight eat only bread without eating anything else. 
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A situation where can > only is true and only > can is false would occur if Midnight ate 
something other than bread (without eating anything else). A situation where only > can is 
true and can > only is false would also arise if the following story holds: 
 
(14)  Situation: only > can is True & can > only is False  
Midnight eats all sorts of things, but usually he refuses to eat whatever Andrea wants 
to make him eat. Therefore, if she wants to make him eat fish, he eats bread, cheese, 
and everything else except fish. The one thing that Andrea can make Midnight eat 
whenever she wants to is bread. But he then always eats other things along with the 
bread, which Andrea did not try to make him eat. 
 
In this situation, although it is only bread that Andrea can make Midnight eat, it does not 
guarantee that Midnight is able to eat only bread without eating anything else. Since he 
always eats things that Andrea did not try to make him eat, it is not the case that Andrea is 
able to make him eat bread without eating anything else. Hence, the two readings do not 
entail each other.2 
From this, I conclude that deriving scope ambiguities solely from entailment is not as 
easy as it looks. Although the entailment issue exists in general for ruling out the wide 
scope of the accusative object, it does not stand in the way of ruling out the narrow scope 
of some nominative objects.  
The same should hold for the earlier example every boy loves some girl: that is, it is 
possible to isolate the wide scope reading in a scenario where each boy loves each girl and 
no girl is loved by more than one boy. Thus, this sentence is also proven to be ambiguous, 
and the ambiguity should arise from the different semantic representations of the sentence. 
In fact, the Dutch linguist Eddy Ruys originally claims this and argues for the true nature 
of scope ambiguities. His reasoning is based on the fact that our linguistic intuition is not 
only limited to truth of a sentence but is also useful for falsity of a sentence.3 Assuming 
with Ruys, I end this section with the hope that scope ambiguities derived from different 
semantic representations are well-motivated from the semantic point of view. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
I have discussed some major issues regarding scope ambiguities. I first pointed out how 
scope ambiguities seem to be hard to argue for because of the entailment problem. I then 
showed that it is in fact possible to detect independent readings by manipulating contexts.  
On the basis of this argument, I concluded that scope ambiguities are theoretically well 
argued for and that syntax and semantics consistently interact to yield ambiguities. 
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Notes 
1  See  Sug imura  (2012)  fo r  cases  where  the  wide  scope  r ead ing  sudden ly  d i sappear s  in  the  
mo t ion  ve rb  cons t ruc t ion .   
2  See  Sug imura  (2012)  fo r  so me  po ten t i a l  p rob lem wi th  th i s  a l t e rna t i ve .  
3  Th i s  po in t  i s  n i ce ly  summar ized  in  Pau l  E lbourne ’s  (2011)  Mean ing:  A S l im  Gu ide  to  
Seman t i c s .  
